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Abstract
This paper focuses on timing of fertility decisions, conditional on
the level of educational attainment of parents. Timing of fertility and
educational attainment of parents rationalize the negative relation-
ship observed in the data between hourly wages and childbearing. It
is shown how the recent evolution in total fertility rates observed in
developed countries could be in part the result of a transition from
an early childbearing regime to a late childbearing regime. I develop
a general equilibrium overlapping generations model in order to un-
derstand the joint determination of timing of childbearing decisions
together with other household economic decisions in a life cycle frame-
work. I show how idiosyncratic uncertainty might have asymmetric
e¤ects on completed fertility depending on timing of childbearing, gen-
erating the di¤erences in completed fertility observed between house-
holds that di¤er in their level of educational attainment.
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the implications of the level of educational attainment
of households for the timing of fertility decisions. Di¤erences in educational
attainment generate di¤erences in the age pro…le of labor earnings of house-
holds, both in terms of the level of hourly wages and its shape over the life
cycle, a¤ecting timing of fertility decisions. It is shown how changes in tim-
ing of fertility decisions (as a result of increasing female’s access to higher
education) can partially account for the recent evolution in total fertility
rates observed in developed countries. I study, in a cross-section of house-
holds, the relationship between timing of childbearing and other economic
variables, and also the di¤erences in timing depending on the level of edu-
cational attainment of parents. I develop a general equilibrium overlapping
generations model in order to understand the joint determination of timing
of childbearing decisions together with other household economic decisions
in a life cycle framework.
In the model economy proposed, idiosyncratic uncertainty has asymmet-
ric e¤ects on completed fertility depending on timing of childbearing, gen-
erating the di¤erences in completed fertility observed between households
that di¤er in their level of educational attainment. In this respect my ap-
proach departs from traditional explanations in the literature of the negative
relationship between earnings and completed fertility.
Period Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is measured as the “total lifetime num-
ber of births that would be predicted if a representative woman realized the
age-speci…c fertility rates that prevailed in a particular year” (Hotz et al.
(1997)). On the other hand, completed fertility refers to the total number
of children a woman has had during her entire fertile age. Absent changes
in timing of fertility these two measures coincide. However, TFRs might be
misleading in an environment where there are changes in timing of fertility
decisions. This point is also discussed in Bongaarts (1999). Thus, part of the
recent evolution of TFRs in developed countries might be understood as the
result of a transition from an early childbearing regime to a late childbearing
regime.
An increase in level of educational attainment has both a permanent
and a transitory negative e¤ect on TFRs. Highly educated females have on
average less completed fertility. This is the permanent e¤ect. Moreover,
due to di¤erences in timing (highly educated females have children later on
average) there is an additional transitory decrease in TFRs. Therefore, in
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a period of rapid increase in levels of educational attainment of females one
would expect TFRs to drop below their future stable level once the transition
is completed.
Therefore, my objective is to understand how the level of educational at-
tainment of parents determines age-speci…c birth rates, i.e. timing of fertility
decisions and completed fertilities.
The analysis of a cross section of households in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) displays the following stylized facts:
1. Among the younger households (20-29 years old), those who have had
newborns in the last two years have, on average, lower income, due to
the fact that they work less hours and not to the fact that wages di¤er
substantially.
2. Among the older households (30-39 years old), those who have had
newborns in the last two years have, on average, higher income, even
though they work less hours, given that their wages are substantially
higher. Moreover, the decrease in hours worked due to parenthood is
smaller than for younger households.
3. Younger households that have had newborns in the last two years have,
on average, lower level of educational attainment, while the reverse is
true for older households. Thus, parents with no college education have
children earlier on average, while college educated parents delay their
decision of having children.
4. The relationship between wages and childbearing is slightly positive (if
not zero) once we condition for age of the female in the household.
This …ndings are consistent with the observation, as reported in Simon
(1977), that fertility is positively related to earnings once we control for age
and educational groups. The …ndings of Wolpin (1984) also imply a slightly
positive relationship between income and completed fertility and a negative
e¤ect of education of females on completed fertility.
Consequently, I construct a model that is capable of generating age-
pro…les of childbearing depending on educational status similar to those
observed in the data and ask the following question: is the model consis-
tent with facts 1 to 4? The answer is yes, validating the model along the
dimensions of interest.
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The model proposed is a general equilibrium overlapping generations
model with idiosyncratic uncertainty with respect to hourly labor earnings.
In presence of incomplete …nancial markets uncertainty generates a nontrivial
distribution of wealth and income within age cohorts, allowing the study of
the interaction between educational attainment of parents, age, wage/income
status and timing of fertility decisions. Moreover, the assumption of incom-
plete markets and borrowing constraints on households is what generates a
non-trivial relationship between current wages and childbearing decisions,
given that households are not allowed to borrow on their future income. No-
tice that the relationship between income and fertility might be misleading,
provided that hours worked are treated as endogenous. In this environment
timing of fertility decisions are explicitly addressed, in the sense that child-
bearing is modelled as a sequential binary decision.
In the literature the negative relationship between wages/income and
completed fertility has been explained by the quantity-quality trade-o¤ and
the analysis of the time allocation of households. The quantity-quality trade-
o¤ approach, pioneered by Becker (1960), is the …rst attempt to account for
the negative relationship between income and completed fertility by mod-
elling preferences in which parents value not only the quantity but also the
quality of children. In this framework higher income would be associated with
lower quantity but higher quality of children, and therefore higher hourly
wages would imply less completed fertility.
An alternative exploration to account for the negative relationship of
income and number of children is the analysis of time allocation treating
childcare as a time intensive activity. This approach follows Mincer (1963),
Becker (1965) and Willis (1973); and the relationship between fertility and
female labor supply has been extensively studied in the literature. For ex-
ample, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) or Mo¢t (1984) build and estimate
models of life cycle labor supply and fertility; see Browning (1992) or Hotz
et al. (1997) for surveys of this literature. Again, the argument implies that
higher wages are associated with lower fertility.
However, in the model proposed the only reason why highly educated
households have less children than low educated ones is the asymmetric ef-
fect of earnings uncertainty due to di¤erences in timing. The key for this
asymmetry to arise is that children in the environment proposed are treated
as an irreversible consumption durable.
The model can be parameterized to match the di¤erences in completed
fertility depending on educational levels found in the empirical evidence.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical evi-
dence. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the computation and
parameterization of the model. Section 5 discusses the results and compares
them with the empirical evidence and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
This section reports evidence on the di¤erences in timing of childbearing
depending of level of educational attainment of females, the recent evolution
of TFRs in some developed countries and the relationship between income,
wages, hours worked and childbearing. Di¤erent sources have been used and
are speci…ed in every case. This section shows and discusses the empirical
facts 1 to 4 mentioned in the introduction.
2.1 The role of education in fertility
Highly educated females have less children on average and they have them
later. I will use the Current Population Survey (Fertility and Marital Status
Supplement) of January 1994 in order to compute age-education speci…c birth
rates. The whole female population is divided in two groups, those with some
college education or more and those without any college education. Figure 1
reports the age-education birth rates. Notice that I am choosing periods of
two years and I am reporting results for the range of ages between 20 and 39,
the reason for doing so is that it corresponds to the periods I will be using
later in the model.
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Figure 1: Age-Education Birth Rates
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Completed fertility of non-college educated females of ages between 46
and 50 is 2:46 children, while the corresponding …gure for college educated
females is 1:97. Notice that integrating the age pro…les of Figure 1 should
yield exactly these completed fertility …gures, provided that age-education
birth rates were constant over time. Integrating the age-pro…les found in the
cross section of households we get numbers that are very close to completed
fertilities, 2:56 for non-college females and 1:95 for college ones.
2.2 Recent evolution of total fertility rates
Figure 2 displays the evolution of TFRs for some representative OECD coun-
tries.1 Over the period 1970-95 TFRs in countries like Spain, Greece, Italy
or Ireland have been continuously decreasing. In Spain TFRs continuously
decreased from 2:84 in 1970 to 1:18 in 1995, 2:43 to 1:17 in Italy, 3:93 to 1:87
in Ireland and 2:34 to 1:35 in Greece.
1I thank Pedro Mira for providing me with these numbers. Ahn and Mira (1999) study
the relationship between the evolution of TFRs and female employment rates.
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Figure 2: Evolution of TFRs in Selected Countries
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This process of decreasing TFRs has been simultaneous to a progressive
and continuous increase in the level of educational attainment of females. In
Spain, in 1960 2% of females between ages 18 and 24 were (or had been)
enrolled in higher education, while this …gure continuously increased until
25% in 1990. In 1970 this …gure was still 10%, below that of the USA a
decade before (13% in 1960).
However, in the USA, as well as in the Scandinavian countries, TFRs
decreased substantially between 1970 and 1980, but started increasing after-
wards, specially in the second half of the eighties. TFRs stabilized in the
USA slightly over 2 during the …rst half of the nineties, below its 1970 level.
The level of educational attainment of females increased substantially in the
USA between 1960 and 1990, but it has been stable since with a ratio of 45%
of college attendance (the highest in OECD countries).
Thus, Spain has experienced a rapid and continuous increase in college
attendance of females in the last 20 years. Moreover, this fast increase is
quantitatively comparable to the one that the USA experienced at a more
moderate pace from 1960 until the early 1990’s.
Developed countries have experienced a transition from an early child-
bearing regime to a late childbearing regime, due to the increase in female’s
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access to higher education. Bongaarts (1999) discusses the implications of
changes in timing for the evolution of TFRs, even though he does not directly
relate changes in timing to changes in educational attainment of females.
Period t TFR is measured using the age-speci…c birth rates as follows:
TFRt =
44X
a=15
BRt;a
where BRt;a represents the period t age-speci…c birth rate of the age a cohort
(number of births in period t from females with age a divided by number of
females of age a). Therefore, the TFR in period t is the completed fertility
that a representative female would have, provided that over her entire lifetime
she would experience birth rates at every age as those observed in period t.
However, during the transition from an early childbearing regime to a late
childbearing regime TFRs might be much smaller than completed fertility.
In order to assess the role of changes in timing of childbearing in ex-
plaining the evolution of TFRs I perform the following exercise, using the
age-speci…c birth rates as reported in Figure 1. I assume that age-speci…c
birth rates depending on education are constant at the 1993 level, and com-
pute the implied evolution of TFRs for an economy where over time the
fraction of college educated young females is increasing. Speci…cally, I as-
sume that the fraction of college educated females is increasing linearly from
10% to 45% over a 20 year period and stays constant afterwards.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 3. Notice how this
…gure displays the main features of the evolution of TFRs as observed in
developed countries like the USA or Sweden. TFR decreases continuously
during the …rst 20 years, recuperating afterwards and stabilizing at a new
level below its initial level. The …nal TFR is lower than the initial one because
completed fertility of highly educated households is smaller.
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Figure 3: The Role of Changes in Timing for Evolution of TFRs
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In terms of understanding the evolution observed in countries like Spain,
this picture illustrates how a transition from an early childbearing regime to
a late childbearing regime could generate continuous and sizeable decreases
in TFRs and one should expect that once the transition is over, TFRs should
increase to their new stationary level, as observed for countries that experi-
enced this transition at earlier stages (USA or Scandinavian countries).
Therefore, timing of fertility is an important aspect in order to understand
the recent evolution of TFRs in developed countries. The question that arises
now is: what determines timing of fertility decisions?
2.3 Income and fertility
I have used data on a cross section of households in 1993 from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), in order to analyze jointly income, wages,
level of educational attainment and the life cycle pattern of fertility and
labor supply decisions. The reason to use PSID data is that this database is
more comprehensive in terms of sources of income and hours worked of adult
members of the household.
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In the database there are 2,880 observations on households formed by a
male and female adults such that the female’s age is between 18 and 40 years
old. Most of the results I will discuss apply to this subsample. The reason
why I will mainly focus on male and female adult households is to avoid
results being in‡uenced by single parenthood, even though the results are not
a¤ected when using the whole sample regardless of household composition.
This way we can compare the empirical evidence with the model results, that
abstract from household composition e¤ects.
Throughout this analysis I will refer to the age of a household as the age
of the female in the household.
Table I reports, for households formed by a male and female adults, the
fraction of households within the given cohort that have had a newborn
during the last two years,2 together with average household income depending
on whether they had a newborn or not during the last two years. The fraction
of households with newborns is clearly decreasing in age. Notice also that
for younger cohorts (20-24 and 25-29), those who have had newborns in the
last two years have lower income than those who did not. However, for older
cohorts (30-34 and 35-39) the reverse is true.
Table I: Newborns and Income
Cohort
Fraction
with newb.
Income
w/o newb.
Income
with newb.
20¡ 24 0:39 32; 776 25; 464
25¡ 29 0:30 42; 492 38; 662
30¡ 34 0:23 46; 709 55; 011
35¡ 39 0:11 54; 733 55; 842
Figure 4 shows a more detailed analysis depending on age. The fraction of
households that have had newborns in the last two years is clearly decreasing
in age. Also, we observe that up to age 28 average income of those who decide
to have newborns is smaller, while the reverse is true in general for households
where the woman is older than 28.
2The fraction of households with newborns coincides with cohort-speci…c birth rates
under the two following assumptions: childbearing cannot occur more than once in a two
year period and there is only one child born.
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Figure 4: Comparison of Households with and without Newborns
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In order to avoid problems of comparability I have excluded from Table
I those households that are formed only by one female. Table II reports the
same statistics for households formed by an adult woman alone. We observe
that the fraction of households with newborns in the last two years is also
decreasing in age. Again, within the youngest cohorts, those who have had
newborns have lower average income, while this fact is reversed for cohort 30-
34, but not for 35-39. In what follows I will focus exclusively on households
formed by a male and female adults.
Table II: Female Only Households. Newborns and Income
Cohort
Fraction
with newb.
Income
w/o newb.
Income
with newb.
20¡ 24 0:24 17757 8611
25¡ 29 0:16 17925 15011
30¡ 34 0:10 16950 18040
35¡ 39 0:10 21588 15773
Now, I address the issue of how the decision of having children is related
to hours worked and wages depending on age. In Table III the …rst two
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columns refer to the male, with and without newborns respectively. The
third and fourth columns refer to the female in the household. We observe
that there is no signi…cant di¤erence in hours worked by males between those
who have had newborns and those who do not. However, there is signi…cant
di¤erence in the number of hours worked by the woman of the household.
Table III: Hours Worked
Cohort
Hours worked
M w/o newb.
Hours worked
M with newb.
Hours worked
F w/o newb.
Hours worked
F with newb.
20¡ 24 2; 064 1; 982 1; 322 791
25¡ 29 2; 031 2; 075 1; 393 897
30¡ 34 2; 023 2; 042 1; 237 1; 110
35¡ 39 2; 024 1; 974 1; 295 939
Figure 4 also reports hours worked by the household as a fraction of
discretionary time.3 Clearly, hours worked by households with newborns are
smaller, and notice also that the gap between hours worked by households
who have had newborns and those who did not is substantially bigger for
younger households.
Table IV: Hourly Wages
Cohort
Wage Male
w/o newb.
Wage Male
with newb.
Wage Female
w/o newb.
Wage Female
with newb.
20¡ 24 9:82 9:03 7:40 7:54
25¡ 29 12:66 13:04 9:84 9:60
30¡ 34 14:72 16:74 10:41 13:90
35¡ 39 16:15 19:38 12:33 14:17
According to Table IV, hourly wages are not signi…cantly di¤erent be-
tween those households with and without newborns for households younger
than 30 years old. However, for households 30 years old or older hourly wages
are substantially higher for both the male and the female in households with
newborns. See Figure 4 for a more detailed age range analysis regarding the
3Assuming that discretionary time is 15 hours a day per adult, seven days a week, 52
weeks a year, we …nd a total time endowment of 10,920 hours per household. Average hours
worked by household in the sample are 2,836, 26% of 10,920. This numbers are roughly
consistent with the evidence that households allocate around 1/3 of their discretionary
time to market activities, which is the standard value in the business cycle literature.
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relationship between wages and childbearing as a function of age. Finally,
notice in Figure 5 that the conclusions are not the e¤ect of considering av-
erage household wage, and these facts hold for both the male and female
separately.
Figure 5: Wages and Education, with and without Newborns
With Newborns - - - - - Without Newborns ———
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Hence, among younger households those who have newborns have lower
income because they work less, not because they have lower wages than
households without newborns. However, for older households, income of
those who have newborns is higher, even though hours worked are less, be-
cause they have signi…cantly higher wages than households without new-
borns.
The relationship between hours worked and level of educational attain-
ment is displayed in Figure 6. Yearly average hours worked by household
are roughly constant between ages 20 and 45, with hours worked by college
educated households being higher. On the average, yearly hours worked are
2; 657 for non-college educated households and 3; 106 for college-educated
households. Notice also how hours worked drop substantially after age 45
for non-college educated households while they drop later for those that are
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college educated. This …gure, using cross-section data, is consistent with the
…ndings of McGrattan and Rogerson (1998) regarding the life-cycle pro…les
of hours worked for di¤erent cohorts.
Figure 6: Fraction of Hours Worked by the Household
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Age of Female
No College
College   
2.4 The relationship between hourly wages and child-
bearing
In order to further assess the relationship between hourly wages and child-
bearing I perform the Logit estimations reported in Table V. First, I run a
Logit estimation with childbearing as a dependent binary variable and hourly
household wage as the independent variable, the results are reported in the
…rst column of Table V. This exercise yields an estimate of ¡0:066, which
implies a slope coe¢cient of ¡0:013 for the derivative of the probability of
childbearing with respect to wages. Childbearing is more likely when wages
are lower. The question remaining is whether this relationship is the result
of life cycle e¤ects, namely childbearing mostly occurring at the beginning
of household’s lifetime, when given the age-pro…le of hourly earnings wages
are lower.
Table V: Logit estimates of the relationship
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between wages and childbearing
Total Sample Total Sample Non-College College
Hourly wage -0.066 0.0037 0.0024 0.0034
Slope -0.013 0.00062 0.00037 0.00060
Std. Error 0.0032 0.0023 0.0040 0.0029
Age female – -0.044 -0.047 -0.040
Slope – -0.0073 -0.0074 -0.0071
Std. Error – 0.0019 0.0027 0.0026
To control for age (i.e. timing of childbearing decisions) I run a Logit es-
timation with childbearing as a dependent binary variable and hourly house-
hold wage and age of female as independent variables, see the second column
of Table V. Notice that this exercise implies that the sign of the coe¢cient on
wages changes, yielding an estimate of 0:0037 for hourly wages, which implies
a value of 0:00062 for the derivative of the probability of childbearing with
respect to wages. The change in the sign of the wage coe¢cient is easily seen
in Figure 4, where, for households older than 28 years old, wages are higher
for those who have newborns than for those who don’t, while for younger
households there is no signi…cant di¤erence in wages. However, this posi-
tive relationship might be the result of di¤erences in educational attainment:
college educated (higher wages) households have children later, see Figure 1.
Now, in order to further control for the level of educational attainment
of the household, I subdivide the sample between college and non-college
educated households. For the non-college subsample (column 3 of Table V)
the coe¢cient on wages is even smaller, 0:00037 for the derivative coe¢cient.
For the college subsample (column 4 of Table V) the derivative coe¢cient
on wages is 0:00060. We observe how once educational attainment is taken
into account, the relationship between wages and childbearing becomes even
smaller, if not zero.
These results suggest that household’s hourly wages are not signi…cantly
correlated (or slightly positively, if any, given the standard errors reported)
with childbearing once we control for timing of fertility decisions and the
level of educational attainment.
This …ndings are consistent with the …ndings of Simon (1977), regarding
the positive relationship between earnings and completed fertility once we
control for age and educational levels. Wolpin (1984) …nds a positive but
small relationship between income and childbearing, after controlling for age.
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3 The Model
The objective is to construct a model that is capable of generating age-pro…les
of childbearing depending on educational status similar to those reported in
Figure 1. Then, such a model will be tested in its ability to shed light on the
empirical …ndings reported in the previous section and summarized in facts
1 to 4.
The economy is populated by a continuum of overlapping generations
households, each of which is formed by a male and female adults and poten-
tially children. Households live for a …nite number of periods, J , retirement
is compulsory at age jr. The fertile period of a household is the …rst j¤
periods.
There are two types of households depending on their level of educational
attainment, denote them H, for High, and L, for Low. Let Ã 2 (0; 1) denote
the fraction of households with low educational level. The educational choice
is not explicitly modelled in this environment, it is assumed that this decision
has been made previously to age 18 (…rst period in the model). Acquiring
a high level of education has a cost in terms of time needed during the …rst
periods of life, but there is no monetary cost associated to it.4
Households derive utility from “adult equivalent consumption” (this will
be discussed in detail in the parameterization section) within the household,
leisure and family size. Therefore, altruism is not modelled in this environ-
ment. Having children is costly both in terms of resources, children reduce
adult equivalent consumption, and time.
Labor productivity of household i, measured in terms of e¢ciency units
of labor, is the product of a deterministic and a stochastic component. The
deterministic age component (²j;i) di¤ers across age, j, and the level of ed-
ucational attainment of household i. The stochastic idiosyncratic compo-
nent (´i), invariant across age but potentially di¤erent across educational
groups, follows a …nite state Markov process with stationary transition ma-
trix Q(´; ´0) = Prob(´t+1 = ´
0j´t = ´).
Markets are incomplete in the sense that insurance markets are assumed
to be missing and there exists a nonnegativity constraint on households’ asset
position. Households can only insure against income uncertainty by trading
a one-period uncontingent bond.
4Potentially, it would be very interesting to include those, especially if the objective is
to endogeneize the educational choice.
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The educational attainment of parents enters in the model in two ways.
On the one hand parents with high educational level have to spend some of
their time while young acquiring this higher skill level. On the other hand,
highly educated households face a higher and steeper deterministic age pro…le
of labor earnings. The speci…c shape of the age-earnings pro…le of households
depending on educational attainment will be discussed later.
3.1 Timing of the model and of fertility decisions
I will consider one period in the model as two years and households live for
30 periods and retire in period 24. Every household is formed by a male and
female adult. The fertile period is the …rst 10 periods. So, the model could be
interpreted as a world where individuals become economically independent
at age 18, they retire at age 64 and death occurs at age 78. I assume there is
no uncertainty about length of lifetime. Upon retirement households receive
a retirement pension …nanced through a pay-as-you-go social security system.
Every period households 1 (18 years old) through 10 (36 years old) decide
whether to have one additional child next period or not. Thus, households
with newborns range from ages 20 to 39.
Households with high educational level have to spend a fraction of their
time during the …rst four periods of life acquiring skills.
When children turn 18 they leave the household of their parents and form
a new household.
Explicitly, timing in the model regarding childbearing decisions works as
follows:
Period 1 (18 years): 1st child decision
Period 2 (20 years): 1st child born with probability '
...
Period 10 (36 years): Last child decision
Period 11 (38 years): 1st child turns 18 and leaves / Last child born
...
Period 20 (56 years): Last child turns 18 and leaves
...
Period 24 (64 years): Mandatory Retirement
...
Period 30 (76 years): Last period
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3.2 The problem of the household
Households maximize expected utility at the initial period, choosing con-
tingent plans for household consumption, hours worked, and when and how
many children to have. The fertility decision is modelled so that every period
during the fertile years the household decides whether to have one additional
child next period or not. There is uncertainty associated to that decision in
the sense that, conditional on having decided to have a newborn next period,
this event will happen with probability ' 2 (0; 1); I will consider ' as a …xed
parameter constant across households and age. However, there is no uncer-
tainty if the household decides not to have a newborn. Let j¤ denote the last
fertile year of the household, which is known with certainty, i.e. ' = 0, for
all j > j¤.
Acquiring a high level of education is time consuming and having children
is costly both in terms of time and resources once they are born.
Preferences of a household depend on adult equivalent consumption, leisure
and family size, according to the following functional form:
JX
j=1
¯j¡1U(cj; lj; nh;j; nj) (1)
U(c; l; nh; n) = (1¡ ¹) 1
1¡ ¾1
"Ã
c
g(nh)
!°
(1¡ l¡ h(nh)¡ Â¸)1¡°
#1¡¾1
+
¹
1
1¡ ¾2 (2 + n)
1¡¾2 (2)
where c denotes total household consumption, l are hours worked, nh is the
number of children staying at home and n is the total number of children
regardless of whether they are still at home or not. The function g(¢) is used
to transform units of household consumption into units of adult equivalent
consumption, depending on the number of children at home. The function
h(¢) determines the time cost of children staying at home, which will be
decreasing in age.
The constant ¸ denotes the amount of time needed to acquire a high level
of education, and Â is an indicator function that takes value 1 for the …rst
four periods of a household acquiring skills and zero otherwise.
The functional form proposed implies that preferences depend additively
on the consumption-leisure bundle with the standard CRRA speci…cation,
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and on family size (the term 2 + n) with a curvature parameter given by ¾2.
The parameter ¹ determines the weight that households put on family size
in their preferences.
The problem of the household can be written recursively. Households
are indexed by: i, type (high or low education); a, asset position; ´, labor
productivity status; j, age; and zj, history of past fertility decisions. The
element zj is a vector of zeros and ones, depending on whether the household
had a child or not at every age from 2 to j. This element keeps track of the
number and age of children in the household. ©t(i; a; ´; j; zj) denotes the
measure of households of type (i; a; ´; j; zj) at time t.
Then, the problem of a household can be written as follows. Households
choose consumption, c, assets next period, a0, hours worked, l, and whether
to have a child next period or not, d, to solve the following programming
problem:
vt(i; a; ´; j; z
j) = max
c;a0;l;d
fU (c; l; zj)+
+¯
Z
vt+1(i; a
0; ´0; j + 1; zj+1)Q(´; d´0)g (3)
subject to:
c+ a0 = (1¡ ¿ t)wt²j;i´l + (1 + rt)a if j < jr
c+ a0 = SSt + (1 + rt)a; if j ¸ jr (4)
a0 ¸ 0; c ¸ 0 (5)
l 2 (0; 1)
l 2 (0; 1¡ ¸), if i = H and j  4 (6)
©t+1 =M(©t) (7)
where
d =
(
1 , if decide to have a newborn and j < j¤
0 otherwise
(8)
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It is understood that ²j;i is equal to zero whenever the household is retired.
Individual households rent their e¢ciency units of labor and their assets
to …rms, and receive in exchange competitive prices wt and rt, that depend on
the aggregate measure of households, ©t. Upon retirement households receive
a retirement pension, SSt, …nanced through a pay-as-you-go social security
system …nanced with labor taxes, denoted by ¿ t. Households maximize taking
prices and the aggregate law of motion M as given.
3.3 Technology
I assume that the aggregate production frontier in this economy is given
by a Cobb-Douglas production function. Therefore, the aggregate resource
constraint is:
Ct +Kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±)Kt = KµtN1¡µt (9)
whereKt is aggregate capital stock, Nt is aggregate number of e¢ciency units
of labor, ± 2 (0; 1) denotes the depreciation rate and µ 2 (0; 1).
4 Computation and Parameterization
The model is computed for its steady-state equilibrium and compared to the
results obtained from the empirical evidence.
The algorithm used to compute the steady-state equilibrium works as
follows:
² Choose an initial guess on prices.
² Compute working backwards the value functions and policy functions
from the household problem.
² Using the policy functions compute growth rate of population and the
stationary population structure implied by it.
² Given the population structure and the policy functions, market clear-
ing yields new guess for prices.
² Iterate until convergence in prices and growth rate of population is
reached.
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The model has been calibrated to the USA economy. Therefore, as a
benchmark I take the model with a pay-as-you-go Social Security system;
workers contribute 10:7% of their labor income to the social security system,
this implies a replacement rate of 45:9% (retirement pensions equal to less
than half of the average labor earnings of the same period). I choose this
benchmark because it replicates the system in the USA, where the Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance (OASI) rate is 10:7%.5
The fraction of low education households is set to Ã = 0:6, equal to the
average found in the PSID sample.
The preference parameters are reported in Table VI. The key element
in the calibration is the choice of values for ¾1, ¾2 and ¹, that has been
done such that the model is consistent with completed fertility and timing of
fertility as observed in the data. It is important to note that the smaller the
risk aversion, ¾1, the larger is the di¤erence in completed fertility between
the high and low education groups, so that ¾1 is chosen to match the gap
in completed fertility between those two groups. On the other hand, the
parameter ¾2 determines the shape of the age pro…le of fertility. High ¾2
(low intertemporal elasticity of substitution regarding family size) implies
fertility more concentrated at the beginning of household’s lifetime, so that
family size would be more constant over the life cycle. Finally, the parameter
¹ determines the levels of completed fertility.
Table VI: Preference Parameters
Parameter Value
¾1 2.60
¯ 0.96
° 0.35
¸ 0.20
¹ 0.75
¾2 1.25
Those parameters together imply that completed fertility for low-education
households is 2:45 (2:46 in the data), and 1:99 for high-education households
(1:97 in the data). It is remarkable how the value of ¾1 chosen to match the
5Total Social Security taxes in the USA are 15:3%, but those include also Medicare
and Disability Insurance. For a speci…c treatment of Social Security and the e¤ects of its
potential reform, see Conesa and Krueger (1999).
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di¤erence in completed fertility between educational levels is in the range of
values obtained in the business cycle literature.
The value chosen for the yearly discount factor is 0:98, which implies
¯ = 0:9604 given the choice of length of a period. Together with ¾1, it
implies that in the steady state the yearly interest rate is 6%, the yearly
capital-output ratio is 3:0 and (given the choice of ±) the yearly investment-
output ratio is 18%. The share of consumption in the utility function is set
to ° = 0:35, so that in the steady state households will spend on average 26%
of their discretionary time working, as we observe in the PSID data. The
fraction of time spent acquiring skills for the …rst four periods of households
with high level of education is set to ¸ = 0:2, i.e. we are considering that
acquiring skills is equivalent to a part-time job for each of the adults in the
household in terms of time requirement.
The function g(¢) is taken to be g(nh) = 1:7+0:5 ¢nh. This choice follows
the adult equivalence Oxford-scale, that was later adopted by the OECD
and Eurostat. This is an additive scale that weights the …rst adult as 1, the
second as 0:7 and children (below 18) as 0:5. For a discusion of this and
other equivalence scales, see Van Praag and Warnaar (1997).
The function h(¢) is set so that the time requirement for a newborn is 0:2
(roughly the time requirement of a part-time job for each of the adults in
the household) and it is linearly decreasing in the age of children until 0 for
an 18 year old (age at which children leave home). This time requirement
function is consistent with the estimates reported by Browning (1992).6
The probability of having a newborn at period t conditional on having
chosen to do so in period t¡ 1, is set to ' = 0:85.
For technology parameters, reported in Table VII, I chose standard values
in the business cycle literature. Namely, a share of labor in output of 64%
and a yearly depreciation rate of 6%.
Table VII: Technology Parameters
Parameter Value
µ 0.36
± 0.1136
The deterministic age pro…les of labor earnings for both low and high level
of education households are taken from the PSID data. Figure 7 reports labor
6Figure 3 in Browning (1992) displays the time requirement only for the female adult,
and the estimates are themselves based on econometric estimates by Hotz and Miller
(1988) considering female time allocation only.
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income per hour worked for both college and non-college households. Those
series have been …ltered and the trend component has been used for the
model computation. Notice that average wages of households with high level
of educational attainment are higher, and also its age-pro…le is steeper, than
the age-pro…le found for households with low level of educational attainment.
It is important to bear in mind that by dealing with the household as a uni…ed
decision unit in the way the model does, the opportunity cost of childbearing
will be the average hourly wage in the household and not the hourly wage of
the female.
Figure 7: Age Pro…le of Hourly Wages
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For the stochastic component of labor earnings I follow Hubbard et al.
(1994). They use PSID data to estimate the idiosyncratic component of
(the log of) labor earnings, for di¤erent educational groups. They …nd that
autocorrelation of earnings is roughly 95% for both low and high educated
households, and that the variance of the idiosyncratic component of low ed-
ucated households is twice that of college educated households. Then, I take
their estimates and approximate this autoregressive process by a …ve state
Markov chain. In order to do so I use the procedure described in Tauchen
and Hussey (1991), resulting in …ve values for the productivity status and
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the correspondent transition matrix, reported in Table VIII and Table IX
respectively.
Table VIII: Individual Productivity Parameters
Parameter Low Edu. High Edu.
´1 0.6097 0.6967
´2 0.7910 0.8424
´3 1.0000 1.0000
´4 1.2647 1.1870
´5 1.6402 1.4353
Table IX: Yearly Transition Matrix
Q(´; ´0)=
26666664
0:7376 0:2473 0:0150 0:0002 0:0000
0:5555 0:2328 0:0169 0:0001
0:5333 0:2221 0:0113
0:5555 0:1947
0:7376
37777775
The …rst row in the transition matrix is the probability of realizing next
period shocks 1 through 5 conditional on today’s realization of shock 1. Given
that I chose one period in the model to be two years and that the estimates
of Hubbard et al. (1998) are yearly data, the transition matrix has to be
raised to the power of two to be consistent with the choice of model period
length.
5 Results
Figure 8 shows the main results of the model economy in terms of timing
of childbearing, as compared to the empirical …ndings from Figure 1. The
parameter ¾2 was chosen to generate a decreasing age-pro…le of birth rates for
low educated households, while for highly educated households it generates
a hump shape, as observed in the data. However, low educated households
tend to concentrate more of their childbearing at early periods in comparison
with the data. Completed fertility for low-education households is 2:45 (2:46
in the data), and 1:99 for high-education households (1:97 in the data).
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Figure 8: Age-Education Birth Rates: Model Economy
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The model replicates the following empirical fact: for younger households
wages do not di¤er substantially between households that have newborns
and households who do not; however, for older households, those with new-
borns have on average higher wages than those without them. See Figure
9 as compared to Figure 4. Also, notice that average income is smaller for
young households with newborns than for those without newborns, while
the reverse is true for older households. Low-educated households (with
low wages) would choose to have children earlier in their lifetime, but some
“lucky” highly educated households would choose to have children earlier
too. This e¤ect, together with the fact that the di¤erence between college
and non-college wages is increasing in age, results in no signi…cant di¤erence
in wages between those who have newborns earlier in their lifetime and those
who do not. Highly educated households (with higher and steeper age pro…le
of wages), on the contrary, will have children later on average, so that house-
holds with newborns will have substantially higher wages than those without
them. We observe positive relationship between childbearing and wages as
we see in the data once we take into account di¤erences in timing.
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Figure 9: Comparison of Households with and without
Newborns: Model Economy
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However, the model does not display the fact that older households expe-
rience a smaller decrease in hours worked due to childbearing than younger
ones. Notice also that in the model hours worked by those who do not have
newborns are roughly 30% higher, while in the data this di¤erence is only of
15%.
The life cycle pro…le of hours worked depending on level of educational
attainment of parents is shown in Figure 10, as compared to its empirical
counterpart of Figure 6.7 The model fails to display the fact observed in the
data that college-educated households work on average signi…cantly more
than non-college ones, and it also fails in displaying such a clear hump-shape
as observed in the data.
7The hump-shaped life cycle pattern of hours worked, both for male and female indi-
viduals, has been documented in McGrattan and Rogerson (1998). They focus on how
this pattern has changed over time and mention: “several factors that may be relevant in
accounting for these reallocations: changes in Social Security bene…ts, fertility rates, and
family structure.”
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Figure 10: Fraction of Hours Worked: Model Economy
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Essentially, the model generates timing of fertility and a relationship be-
tween wages and childbearing (and income and childbearing) similar to those
found in the data. Moreover, conditional on educational status and age,
wages are slightly positively related to childbearing as we observed in the
data.
5.1 A closer look at the relationship between wages
and childbearing
In order to further assess the relationship between wages and childbearing
implied by the model I perform the following exercise. I generate by Mon-
tecarlo simulation a random sample of households from the model (of equal
size to that of the PSID sample) and then perform on it exactly the same
type of exercise I did on the PSID sample to explore the relationship between
wages and childbearing and the e¤ects of timing on it. Table X reports this
results (those should be compared with its empirical counterpart reported in
Table V).
Table X: Logit estimates of the relationship
27
between wages and childbearing. Model Economy
Total Sample Total Sample Low Educ. High Educ.
Hourly wage -0.1027 0.038 0.044 0.030
Slope -0.018 0.0056 0.0064 0.0045
Age female – -0.0704 -0.071 -0.067
Slope – -0.0102 -0.0103 -0.0099
It is remarkable how closely similar is the coe¢cient regarding the re-
lationship between childbearing and wages generated by the model (¡0:10)
as compared to the one obtained from the PSID sample (¡0:07). As in the
data, once we control for age of the female the coe¢cient on wages becomes
positive and very close to zero. However, the slope coe¢cients corresponding
to wages are higher in the model generated data than in the PSID sample.
Overall, the main result seems very robust: hourly wages are negatively
correlated with the probability of childbearing, but once we control for age
(i.e. timing of fertility decisions) the relationship between wages and child-
bearing becomes positive and substantially smaller. The model, however,
implies a larger impact of wages on childbearing than observed in the data.
5.2 The role of income uncertainty
In order to assess the e¤ects of labor earnings uncertainty over fertility rates
and timing of childbearing I perform the following experiment. I …x prices at
the level of the benchmark economy (6% for the interest rate) and compute
optimal behavior of households where the transition matrix for the stochastic
process of labor productivity is set equal to the identity matrix.
As a result we obtain that both low and high educated households will
have an average of 2:24 children over their lifetime, so that labor earnings
uncertainty increases (decreases) completed fertility of households with a
low (high) level of educational attainment with respect to an ex-ante average
optimal family size of 2:24 children. Moreover, yearly population growth rate
would be 0:43%; roughly the same as in the uncertainty case.
The reasons for this pattern to arise are that in an environment with
uncertainty where households cannot borrow on future income, it is optimal
to have children when the stochastic component is more favorable (remember
that in this environment childbearing is positively correlated with hourly
wages conditioning on age). If households want to have children later in their
lifetime, waiting for “the right time” for childbearing reduces fertility rates.
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Households with a stream of bad realizations will decide to have less children
than their ex-ante optimal family size. On the other hand, we have seen
that the optimal family size for the average low-education household is 2:24
children and to have them early; uncertainty does not a¤ect substantially
childbearing decisions at the beginning of their lifetime, but later in the
reproductive period some households might have been “lucky” enough as to
decide to have an additional child, increasing their average fertility.
Therefore, in this framework it is the asymmetric e¤ect of earnings un-
certainty, depending on timing of childbearing, what generates that highly
educated (higher wages) households have on average less children than those
households with low level of educational attainment. The key for this result
to arise is that children are treated as an irreversible consumption durable,
and irreversibility is key in the presence of earnings uncertainty.
6 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the study of household’s decisions regarding timing of
fertility, depending on the level of educational attainment of parents. It is
shown how the recent evolution in total fertility rates observed in developed
countries could be the result of a transition from an early childbearing regime
to a late childbearing regime, due to the increase in level of educational
attainment of females. Measures of total fertility rates might be misleading
in an environment with important changes in timing of childbearing, even
if completed fertility does not change substantially. Then, the objective
is to understand the determinants of timing of fertility decisions and its
relationship with educational attainment.
The main empirical …ndings from a cross section of households in the
PSID data base is that the relationship between hourly wages and childbear-
ing is slightly positive (if not zero) once we condition for age of the female
in the household. These …ndings suggest that in order to understand the
relationship between wages and fertility the timing of childbearing decision
might be an important factor, in particular because it implies a di¤erential
behavior between households depending on their level of educational attain-
ment. I show how a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with
idiosyncratic uncertainty can be calibrated to match the timing of fertility
facts. In the model timing of fertility decisions are explicitly addressed, in
the sense that childbearing is modelled as a sequential binary decision. Such
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a model is consistent with the …ndings regarding the relationship between
wages and childbearing.
The role of labor earnings uncertainty is important in this framework. In
fact, it has asymmetric e¤ects on the fertility of households depending on
their educational level, increasing completed fertility for households with low
education and decreasing it for households with high education. Households
with low level of educational attainment have children earlier in their lifetime,
the existence of earnings uncertainty does not change their childbearing de-
cisions at the beginning of their reproductive period. However, towards the
end of their reproductive period some households have experienced a high
sequence of stochastic realizations of labor earnings and might decide to have
an additional child. The contrary happens to highly educated households,
they tend to postpone childbearing, and given that some households might
have experienced a low sequence of stochastic realizations of labor earnings
they would decide to reduce their ex-ante optimal family size. This happens
in an environment where absent uncertainty optimal family size is the same
for both household types. The key for the asymmetric e¤ects of uncertainty
to arise is the di¤erence in timing of fertility together with irreversibility of
childbearing decisions. It is in this respect that this approach departs from
previous explanations in the literature of the negative relationship between
earnings and completed fertility.
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